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Social Protection and the PoliticS of anger in the Middle eaSt 
and north africa • This article investigates the confessional resource dependent 
welfare regimes of the Middle East and North Africa. It emphasizes the elite-captured 
nature of resources as well as the dependence of these regimes on oil and gas revenues or 
the acquisition from state-assets. The article pays a special attention to religious and other 
non-state actors in the administration and delivery of social protection. By examining key 
institutional features in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Yemen and 
Tunisia, the article also highlights the ways in which differential sets of social protection 
institutions succeeded in ensuring social peace and loyalty to the regimes. In addition, by 
identifying shortcomings and strengths in the administration of public goods, the article 
highlights the prospects for future and more successful reforms. In the conclusions, the 
«politics of anger» that led to the Arab Spring of 2011 is briefly elucidated. 
KEywordS social protection, welfare regimes, corruption, resource curse, Middle 
East and North Africa, politics of anger.
1. INTRODUCTION1
In the Spring of 2011, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region faced 
a series of unprecedented revolts, which forced politicians, policy-makers, 
scholars and international observers to reflect more carefully on the existing 
institutional set-up of social protection, on the kind of public administration 
reforms that are urgently required and on what are the future prospects for 
the modernization and the democratization of these societies. During the so-
called Arab Spring, riots suddenly exploded in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, 
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Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait, Yemen and 
Tunisia. However, while in some countries the transition has led to an apparently 
smooth regime change (Egypt and Tunisia) or to the maintenance of a fragile 
status-quo (Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait), in 
others (Bahrain, Libya, Syria and Yemen) the ghost of civil wars has materialized. 
This article does not aim to provide a full explanation for the Arab re-
volts, but rather it aims to investigate the politics of anger that characterized 
the MENA region over the decades as well as what has been the role of politi-
cal and welfare institutions in reducing or enlarging the reasons for political 
quiescence and protest. In particular, this article aims to address these issues, 
by investigating (1) what kind of welfare model characterizes the countries of 
the MENA region; (2) what was the role of confessional organizations and of 
elite-sponsored programmes in reducing or increasing the reasons for tension; 
and (3) what are the specificities in welfare programmes of this region. In or-
der to achieve these objectives, this article examines the confessional resource 
dependent welfare regimes in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, 
Syria, Yemen and Tunisia. This quite extensive choice of case studies is dic-
tated by the necessity of exploring variation and similarities among countries 
located in a highly diversified region. The MENA region includes countries 
characterized by substantially different levels of socio-economic development 
with different institutional structures and welfare performances. These range 
from the extremely oil rich nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) to the less 
affluent economies of the Mashreq (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, West Bank 
and Gaza, Egypt) and of the Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco 
and Tunisia). In exploring similarities and variance, the article emphasizes 
the systemic dependence that these regimes have developed on oil and gas 
revenues or the acquisition of state-assets. Whilst Algeria, Bahrain, Libya 
and Yemen are rich oil or gas exporters, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria and 
Tunisia remain dependent on the import of oil and food (IMF 2011). The 
elite captured nature in the collection and redistribution of resources as well 
as the important role played by religious and other non-state actors in the 
administration and delivery of social protection are also highlighted here.
In this account, it will be stressed that the diminution of vertical in-
equalities (inequalities among citizens) and horizontal inequalities (inequalities 
among social groups) (Stewart 2008) is crucial to improve the prospects for 
future and more successful reforms. As argued by Greskovits (1998), Van-
huysse (2006) for the cases of Eastern Europe and Latin America, it will be 
demonstrated that political and welfare institutions and, more in particular, 
the model of welfare present in a country are determinant elements to take 
into account when examining the prospects for social peace and stability. 
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They do so by increasing social resilience and, subsequently, societal success 
(Hall and Lamont 2013).
In order to clarify this argument, the article is divided into five main sec-
tions. In the first section, the article discusses the shortcomings and strengths 
related to the abundance or absence of natural resources. A particular attention 
here is given to the «resource curse» hypothesis and its critics. The article then 
proceeds with an analysis of welfare regime typologies. In this second section, 
an examination and classification of the dominant social protection models 
present in the MENA region is provided. The overarching goal of the third 
section is to discuss key institutional features, as well as their repercussion in 
social stratification and in the reproduction of the political, economic, cultural 
and social order. In the fourth section, the article continues with an investiga-
tion of mismanagement in public administration and confessional involvement, 
as this analysis is important to an understanding of the prospects for future 
reform. This is discussed in further detail in the fifth section, as is discussed 
the «politics of anger» that, ultimately, led to the Arab Spring. 
2. Economic Growth, Natural Resources and Political Corruption
Since the 1960s the countries in the MENA region have witnessed large 
fluctuations of their GDP, with significant repercussions for their prospects 
of economic and social progress. During their history, the main economic 
and social indicators of these countries have been linked to the growth of the 
international markets of oil and gas (especially in Algeria, Bahrain, Libya and 
Yemen) and to the fluctuations in the level of fuel and food prices (Egypt, 
Jordan, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia) (IMF 2011; UNECA 2011; Malik and 
Awadallah 2013). This uncertainty and economic vulnerability to oil and gas 
revenues or from fuel and food prices has resulted in the creation of highly 
unstable economies (World Bank 2010a; 2010b), which are still characterized 
by relatively high unemployment rates (Gatti et al. 2013). 
Over the years, several authors have demonstrated that we need to un-
derstand the structure of economies which are heavily dependent on natural 
resources if we are to make judgements about patterns of economic and social 
progress their country’s prospects for democracy (see Huntington 1991; Haber 
and Menaldo 2011). According to the supporters of the «resource curse hy-
pothesis», the presence of natural resources, such as oil and gas, can hinder the 
economic growth and democracy of a country through a variety of different 
means (Diamond 2008). For Ross (2012), these include (i) a rentier mechanism 
which concerns the tendency of governments to adopt low tax rates and high 
spending in order to ensure their political survival; (ii) a repression mechanism 
which involves the possibility of governments of finding additional resources 
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to finance internal security forces which are then used to silence dissenting 
voices; and (iii) a modernization mechanism which implies the possibility of 
governments limiting the chances of the population to undergo necessary 
societal changes by silencing the voices of alternative civic associations. In a 
similar vein, other eminent scholars have emphasized the importance of (iv) 
a state assets mechanism (Boix 2003) which concerns the influence that non 
mobile state assets have in hindering the democratization process by limiting 
the chances of political elites to transfer their accumulated wealth abroad; (v) 
a corruption mechanism (Fish 2005) which involves the negative effect of oil in 
encouraging dishonest behaviour by tempting officials to avoid legal restric-
tions and public scrutiny; and (vi) a foreign involvement mechanism which 
concerns the strategic interests and influences of foreign powers (including 
multinationals) in keeping authoritarian regimes alive. 
As demonstrated by several studies (for an extensive review, see Cerami 
2013), the presence of significant natural resources and emergence of political 
and administrative corruption are elements that, inevitably, go hand in hand. 
However, the perception of political and administrative corruption can also 
affect non oil rich countries. In the MENA region, this is often the case and 
it produces clear negative consequences for the quality of their government, 
creating a set of vested-interests and well-entrenched supporting institu-
tions that can prove to be extremely difficult to dismantle (Rothstein 2011). 
Emblematic examples of state-captured in oil and on-oil rich countries have 
been represented by the ruling families in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait, Yemen and Tunisia. 
3.  Confessional Resource Dependent Welfare Regimes in the 
MENA Region 
Despite the vital importance of these elements for the process of modernization 
and democratization, the MENA region remains an extremely poor researched 
area in the field of comparative social policy and public administration stud-
ies in general. Up to the present time, very little attention has been paid to 
the administration of social policy, to its system of governance, to the key 
institutional features of social welfare regimes as well as to the performance 
that welfare institutions have in reducing poverty and income inequality. The 
systems of social protection in the MENA region are not homogenous entities, 
but they are constituted by a variety of welfare arrangements that correspond 
to country-specific institutional set-ups with associated path-dependencies and 
institutional legacies. These systems of social protection do not also fit in any 
of the classifications currently available. Esping-Andersen’s (1990) The Three 
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism was primarily concerned with the establishment 
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of welfare institutions in advanced Western capitalist societies and almost no 
attention has been devoted to religious factors and actors (van Kersbergen and 
Manow 2009) or to the captured nature of resources by political elites. These 
are, however, extremely important elements to take into consideration when 
analyzing the peculiar welfare architecture of the MENA region (Karshenas 
and Moghadam 2006; Jawad 2009). They represent the common features that 
unite instead of dividing seemingly different welfare organizations and models 
of administering and redistributing public goods.
Here, it is argued that five main features characterize the confessional 
resource dependent welfare regimes of the MENA region: 1) the dependence 
of these regimes on oil and gas revenues (or on the acquisition of state-assets); 
2) a confessional involvement in social protection; 3) strong role for nuclear 
and extended family or of tribal, sectarian and religious communities; 4) basic 
state provision in health and education; and 5) market-based social welfare 
for the wealthy (Gal and Jawad 2013, p. 247).
The first common characteristic of these highly differentiated systems of 
social protection can be attributed to the captured nature of resources by the 
political elites with its market and social protection distortive mechanisms. 
As in the case of other oil and gas rich countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (see Cerami and Stubbs 2013), the revenues from natural 
resources have been captured by the political elites, who have, subsequently, 
and in a highly discretionary way, redistributed the benefits according to their 
short-term political and economic objectives. These have involved subsidiz-
ing goods, services and fuels, non productive jobs in the public and private 
sector, ultimately, offering cash benefits to individuals when the latter were 
not sufficient to ensure social peace (Fattouh 2011). Over the years, the elite-
captured nature in the collection of oil and gas revenues and consequent 
politically motivated redistribution of wealth to specifically targeted groups 
of the population has reinforced and enlarged the persistence of political 
clientelism and administrative corruption (Cook 2010). Interestingly, while 
divide and pacify strategies (Vanhuysse 2006; see also Hirschmann 1978) have 
constantly been put in place through universal price subsidies of primary 
goods and the other means elucidated below, sectarian welfare policies have 
been more specifically targeted to specific ethnic and religious groups, such 
as the Shiite Muslims in Lebanon, the Sunni Muslims in Bahrain, Egypt, Jor-
dan, Syria and Yemen, the members of the Gaddafi’s closest tribes (especially 
the Ghadala and Megarha) in Libya – but the list of Shiite-Sunni, Muslim-
Christian or inter-tribes divides could include other countries in the region 
as well. In order to reduce the tensions that resulted from these differential 
social inclusion strategies in political positions and in divided labor markets, 
a strong repressive and military apparatus became a necessity. Interestingly, 
however, where abundance of natural resources was not existent (such as in 
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Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Tunisia), political elites have turned to the private 
wealth acquired through the capture of state-assets into vital means to calm 
the masses and to ensure their survival.
The second and third characteristics of these welfare regimes in transition 
lie, in this case, in the confessional orientation of the system of social protec-
tion and in its particularistic way of redistributing welfare benefits and social 
services. In the MENA region, due to poor public administration capacity 
(OECD 2010), the governance architecture of the welfare regimes is highly 
decentralized. Access to social services and distribution of welfare benefits 
depend, for the most part, on non-state religious actors (Benthall and Bellion-
Jourdan 2003; Heyneman 2004; Karshenas and Moghadam 2006; Jawad 2009; 
Jawad and Yakut-Cakar 2010; Cammett and Issar 2010; Cammett and McLean 
2011). By devolving the tasks to decentralized religious and other non-state 
actors (or clans and tribes as in the case of Libya), the pressures caused by 
the state inefficiencies in public administration have been reduced. In this 
way, the religious attachment of the population has been increased and with it 
the loyalty to the dominant political elites (Cammet and McLean 2014). The 
confessional orientation to social protection, which aimed at creating both 
a «good citizen» as well as a «good Muslim» (Gellner 1981; Leca 1994), has 
involved also the development of a peculiar understanding of solidarity, with 
religious precepts that have slowly replaced Weberian rational bureaucratic 
aspirations (Weber [1922] 1968). 
The fourth and fifth and final characteristics lie, in contrast, in the 
severe economic vulnerabilities and dependence that these countries have to 
exogenous economic shocks and the involvement of the state in providing 
basic services for the poor and market-based social welfare for the wealthy. 
In the case of the oil and gas rich economies of Algeria, Bahrain, Libya and 
Yemen, the source of stability and legitimacy of the political, bureaucratic 
and moral order has been, for the most part, attached to the collection of oil 
and gas revenues. Fluctuations in the level of prices have, as a consequence, 
fostered economic growth when high but have also been extremely destabiliz-
ing when low. Similar to the case of the Russian Federation (see Cook 2007; 
Cerami 2009), most of the countries in the MENA region are characterized 
by an «oil-led social policy» whose positive performance in terms of economic 
modernization and poverty reduction greatly depend on their capacity to 
manage, in an efficient way, the revenues from natural resources. The case of 
Kuwait is among the most emblematic examples, with social peace ensured 
(or bought) by granting to the citizens free health care, education and other 
extensive social security arrangements (El-Katiri et al. 2011). The same can 
also be affirmed for the less resource rich economies of Egypt, Jordan, Mo-
rocco, Syria and Tunisia. In these cases, however, forms of dependence and 
of capture of resources have been more directly linked to how the ruling 
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families have succeeded in securing key economic and political positions 
and economic assets of the country. These have, subsequently, been used to 
redistribute benefits in order to maintain their privileged position, which has 
resulted in a differential set of social protection institutions consisting, besides 
food and fuel price subsidies used to obtain political quiescence, in very basic 
state provision in health and education for the poor and market-based social 
welfare for the wealthy (Gal and Jawad 2013).
These strategies to buy social peace, as extensively used in the case of 
Latina America and Eastern Europe (see Greskovits 1998; Vanhuysse 2006), 
have also largely been employed during the Arab Spring. At the height of the 
mass protests of 2011, the following concessions were, not by chance, made: 
– in Algeria, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and its government im-
plemented several different measures aimed at lowering food prices, such as 
a temporary exemption in the tax burden on sugar and edible oil, coupled 
with a declaration of intention to remove the state of emergency in force 
since 19 years;
– in Bahrain, the Interior Ministry Shaikh Rashid bin Abdula Al Khalifa 
(member of the reigning family Al Khalifa) announced he was hiring 20,000 
people and was providing cash transfers of $ US 2,660 to each family. Despite 
these generous benefits, violent riots, nonetheless, rapidly emerged; 
– in Egypt, ex-President Mubarak (and his successors) promised a 15 
percent increase in government wages and pensions, the creation of a fund 
for small enterprises, and higher subsidies for wheat imports. Interestingly, 
when these measures were not sufficient to calm the protests, regime change 
immediately occurred;
– in Jordan, King Abdullah II ibn Al-Hussein (and his government) 
raised allocations for social protection and announced cuts to taxes on fuel 
and foodstuffs, additional subsidies, and improved civil service salaries and 
pensions. Despite increasing tensions, bloody repression has, to a large extent, 
been avoided;
– in Libya, Muammar al-Gaddafi offered tax exemptions and 500 di-
nars (approximately $ 400) to each family and innumerable other gifts in the 
hope of avoiding the collapse of his regime. However, beside these generous 
benefits, the country soon entered a civil war followed by NATO intervention;
– in Morocco, King Mohammed VI, son of Hassan II, and the head 
of government Abbas El Fassi, close to promulgation of implementing 
measures aimed at lowering the increase in food prices, promulgated a set 
of constitutional reforms with the overarching goal of limiting the disruptive 
consequences of protest by democratizing the political domain;
– in Syria, the President al-Assad announced the establishment of a Na-
tional Fund for Social Aid and the future recruitment of 67,000 civil servants, 
increased allowances for public sector employees, improved cash transfers to 
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poor households, reduced taxes on some food products, a reduction in income 
tax rates, an increase in the minimum wage, and the extension of full health 
coverage to civil service pensioners. Despite all these attempts, civil war was 
not avoided and riots have continued;
– in Yemen, the President Ali Abdullah Saleh promised to increase 
public wages, expand coverage of the social welfare fund by 500,000 additional 
families, pay interim monthly stipend to new school graduates, to reintroduce 
bonuses and allowances to civil servants and so on. When these concessions 
proved insufficient, violent police repression followed;
– in Tunisia, the Ben Ali regime and the interim government promised 
to drastically raise the food subsidies for sugar, rice and wheat, to increase 
transfers to the unemployed and the poorest segments of the population, to 
suspend adjustments in regulated prices, to extend subsidies, and to scale up 
public investments. When these incentives proved insufficient, smooth regime 
change unexpectedly followed (IMF 2011, 22-31).
It becomes immediately evident that all reigning families and govern-
ments have seen in the absence of social protection as a key social transmis-
sion mechanism of protest. When the first concessions became insufficient 
to pacify the masses, police and military repression followed. In the follow-
ing section it will be shown that not only timing and sequencing of reforms 
(Pierson 2004) have played a crucial role in ensuring peace (those countries 
like Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia that immediately accepted 
the demands of protesters also ensured a more peaceful regime change or 
maintenance), but also the key institutional set-up of social protection with 
associated effects in reducing vertical and horizontal inequalities proved to 
be an extremely important element of stability or change. In those welfare 
regimes that limited the set of inequalities between different groups of the 
society, sectarian tensions have, in fact, been reduced and this hastened the 
process of further modernization and democratization. 
4.  Welfare Institutions and the Reproduction of Existing Power 
Relations 
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Yemen and Tunisia 
have established a social insurance system of social protection, which provides 
access to welfare benefits and social services after the payment of social in-
surance contributions. In these countries, the contemporary system of social 
protection dates back to the aftermath of the post-war period, although im-
portant modifications have occurred during the intervening years. The most 
important changes have involved an increased power for the political elites and 
reigning families in setting the rules of the game. Coverage tends to include all 
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citizens employed under labour contracts, with some sporadic extensions for 
household workers, the self-employed and farmers. Special provisions exist 
for particular professional categories. These special categories particularly 
apply to the cases of oil industry workers, police and military personnel and to 
civil servants in strategic sectors of the state. The hidden aim of these special 
schemes is easy to imagine. As happened in communist Eastern Europe and in 
the Russian Federation (Cook 2007; Cerami 2006, 2009), loyalty to the system 
has been ensured by targeting strategic professional categories. These, in turn, 
have helped to maintain the status quo by refraining from making demands 
for institutional and political innovation. 
As far as the pension system is concerned, since the MENA region has a 
young population, pension schemes continue to be based on a «pay-as-you-go» 
system. This has occurred in spite of the increasing demands by international 
financial institutions to enlarge the scope and coverage of private pension 
funds. Retirement age is low and usually set at 60 years for men and 50 or 
55 for women. Substantial reductions exist for some privileged categories of 
workers. Social insurance contributions are not equally divided between the 
employers and employees as in typical Bismarckian-oriented social insurance 
systems. A rate of two-thirds for employers and one-third for employees usu-
ally applies. This system of asymmetrical contribution rates helps to ensure 
loyalty to the regimes, by shifting responsibilities for financing social insur-
ance from individuals to employers, firms (usually state-owned) and public 
authorities. Despite the establishment of social insurance, old age benefits 
are granted under relatively favorable calculation rules, but this applies only 
to workers with official labour contracts. Significant state subsidies also exist 
in all countries under scrutiny here (Robalino 2005; IMF 2011; ISSA 2011; 
UNECA 2011). They cover the pension funds deficit or employers’ contribu-
tion quotas. Old-age benefits are calculated on the basis of the last earning 
record (instead of being based on the life-course), and thus favor more recent, 
usually higher, contribution years and rates. In the MENA region, an average 
replacement rate provides between 70 and 80 per cent of the previous wage, 
which is substantially higher than the replacement rates in force in Eastern 
and Western Europe. However, the devil often lies in the detail, due to the low 
wages of workers (see Angel-Urdinola and Kuddo 2010), the more favorable 
calculations rules are not sufficient to avoid a gentrification of poverty. In 
fact, as a World Bank study has shown (Robalino 2005), pension funds in the 
MENA region tend to favor middle- and high-income workers at the expense 
of low-income workers, with pension systems that are able to cover only a 
relatively modest share of the labour force (33 per cent). 
With regard to health care, the countries in the MENA region are in 
the process of restructuring the universal health care systems established 
during the 1970s. They are doing so by strengthening the health insurance 
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principle, by introducing health insurance funds and by improving the ef-
ficiency in public management. While impressive efforts and progress have 
been made in the last four decades to protect citizens from several health 
hazards (see contributions in Karshenas and Moghadam 2006), improving 
the often obsolete health care infrastructures and extending coverage to a 
large section of the poor population are now the most urgent priorities. In 
Egypt, for example, a World Bank sponsored project has aimed at fostering 
the adoption of a business model of social health insurance operations and 
management by one single national provider. Similarly, in the other countries, 
a primary focus of World Bank’s interventions has been given to improve the 
administration, delivery, financial sustainability, and targeting of social and 
health care services. However, this has implied a decrease in health care ex-
penditures, and a consequent increase in out-of-pocket payments. In presence 
of a clientelistic system in the access and distribution of benefits, for people 
living in the MENA region, this has been translated in a reduction in the 
universality of health care systems that has occurred despite the reassuring 
promises of the reigning families and governments.
Unemployment benefits also follow the social insurance principle, even 
though they are extremely poorly developed. A clear system of unemployment 
insurance exists in Bahrain, Egypt and Tunisia, while in the other countries 
no well developed system of protection against unemployment is, to date, 
available (Angel-Urdinola and Kuddo 2010). Benefits are earnings-related 
and usually do not exceed 50 per cent of the previous wage for a maximum 
duration of six months. Qualifying periods for accessing benefits are also 
strict. In the countries where detailed information is available, an employee 
must have worked over the last six months before having access to unem-
ployment insurance or assistance benefits (ISSA 2011). The strict eligibility 
criteria and the lack of a clear system of protection against unemployment 
and of basic safety nets leaves a large section of the population unprotected 
and extremely vulnerable to poverty and income inequality. Attachment to the 
labour market becomes, in this context, crucial. It ensures, on the one hand, 
the survival for one’s own family. On the other, it simultaneously provides 
unconditional loyalty to the employer and to the regime. When attachment to 
the official labour market is not possible, price subsidies generously granted 
by the political elites to the citizens, welfare benefits and services adminis-
tered and redistributed by religious and other non-state actors (Jawad 2009) 
are the only means to escape from extreme poverty. As shown by two World 
Bank reports (Angel-Urdinola and Kuddo 2010; Gatti et al. 2013), in several 
countries of the MENA region labour legislation is still based on the social 
contract introduced in the post independence era, as it reproduces the set of 
vested interests that had been established between the ruling elites and the 
upper-classes. As a consequence of this residual system of protection against 
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unemployment, most workers in the MENA region continue to remain highly 
vulnerable to unemployment risks (especially to youth unemployment), to 
informality in the labour market, and to extreme poverty and to increasing 
religious fundamentalism (Kindt et al. 2009).
As these confessional resource dependent welfare regimes are based on a 
traditional vision of women as mothers and household workers rather than as 
full-time employees (Karshenas and Moghadam 2006), the system of maternal 
leave and family benefits in the MENA region remains poorly developed. A 
rational system of family policies exist, in Egypt, Iran, Libya, Morocco and 
Tunisia, but even in these cases public administration is poor and benefits 
are granted only for a short period of time do not aim at promoting gender 
equality in the labour market. Maternity leave is paid for only 30 days in Tu-
nisia, 90 days in Egypt, Iran and Libya and for 98 days in Morocco. In these 
countries, child benefits, when available, also cease, in the best case, at 15 or 
18 years of age, thus precluding to the poorest social strata from full access 
to university education (ISSA 2011). As noted by Karshenas and Moghadam 
(2006), women’s participation in the labour market has often and unjustifi-
ably been seen by the ruling elites as anti-Islamic. Even when integration in 
the labour market has occurred, it has served primarily to reconfigure state 
functions and to provide legitimacy to the regime (Krause 2009). Feminization 
of poverty has, hence, been the most obvious result.
5.  Mismanagement in Public Administration and Confessional 
Involvement
Once that the key institutional features of the welfare architecture have been 
highlighted, it remains to clarify how resources have been raised during the 
years so as to finance social programmes, who has been in charge of distri-
buting these resources, under what conditions, for what aims, and who has 
benefited the most. The history of the systems of social protection in Western 
Europe is extremely variegated, as their development has been associated with 
country-specific political, economic and social prerogatives/cleavages. The 
most famous work by Korpi (1983), Baldwin (1990), and Esping-Andersen 
(1990) has, for example, emphasized the important role played by welfare 
institutions in the production and reproduction of the existing political, eco-
nomic and social order. The systems of social protection in Western Europe 
have also been vital in maintaining social stability and political legitimacy in 
times of recession and deep crisis (Iversen and Soskice 2009). More recent 
studies on comparative social policy and international political economy have 
also emphasized the important role that religious and other non-state actors 
have played in influencing the introduction of politically-dominated social 
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welfare systems (van Kersbergen and Manow 2009). The lesson to be learnt 
by van Kersbergen and Manow’s (2009) edited collection is that it is not 
simply party politics and power politics dynamics that matter in the creation 
of specific welfare regime typologies, but also religion and the key actors of 
decentralized public administration. 
Surprisingly, the MENA region has, often, been omitted from such histori-
cal, culturally and administrative oriented analysis. This has occurred in spite of 
the fact that under highly volatile economic conditions, ensuring redistribution 
through non-state religious actors has been the only viable strategy to maintain 
social peace and to institutionalize the often highly polarized political prefer-
ences of citizens. Focusing on the case of Lebanon, Cammett and Issar (2010) 
have highlighted how religious and other non state-actors (Sunni Muslim Future 
Movement and the Shiite Muslim Hezbollah in Lebanon) have influenced the 
policy preferences of specific groups of the population, ultimately, altering 
the formal architecture of the welfare regime. Loyalty of the local population 
has, in this case, been obtained by granting access to social welfare services 
(i.e. health care facilities, access to education, housing, etc.) (see also Cammett 
2014). Similarly, Rothstein and Broms (2010) have accounted for the expan-
sion of religious support in the MENA region in terms of the redistributive 
poverty relief successes that state and non-state actors have obtained thanks 
to the revenues of special religious endowments (the waqf). Waqf refers to the 
religious endowments and assets that are in the hands of religious establishments 
and that are, in principle, used for public benefits. All Muslim countries have 
ministries of waqf (Jawad and Yakut-Cakar 2010, 665). Revenues and donations 
from the waqf have, subsequently, been used to develop a peculiar system of 
social protection (waqf-fare local state), that succeeded in ensuring loyalty to 
the dominant religious, political and moral order. On a similar vein, for Jawad 
(2009) and Jawad and Yakut-Cakar (2010), religious and other non-state ac-
tors have played a far from irrelevant role in welfare production through the 
collection and redistribution of two religious financial resources (the waqf and 
the zakat). The zakat is a 2.5 per cent tax on assets paid by the members of the 
community (often the richest members). According to Jawad and Yakut-Cakar 
(2010, 665), it has historically played important role in income redistribution 
and socio-economic development objectives, and it is based on the notion of 
community solidarity. This has also included the administration and redistri-
bution of welfare benefits as well as a decentralized public administration and 
delivery of social services. According to the authors, and in absence of clear 
state interventions, this confessional approach to social policy administration 
helped to resolve the major economic and social problems that the countries 
of the MENA region have faced during their history. 
To go into more details, non-state actors involved in «tax farming» in 
the MENA region involve politically closed organizations such as Dar Al 
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Aytam (Muslim Sunni) and Emdad (Muslim Shi’a – affiliated to Hezbollah) 
in Lebanon, Da’wa Islamiya (close to the National Islamic Front) in Sudan 
and the Jami’yyat Da’wa Islamiya (close to Muammar Al-Gaddafi) in Libya. 
Several hundred NGOs or charity associations associated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood exist in Egypt and in Jordan and with Hamas in Palestine, the 
Behzisti organization in Iran or Caritas (closed to the Catholic Church) in 
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine where there are significant Christian 
minorities. Religious and other non-state actors also include international hu-
man relief organizations, such the International Islamic Relief Organization in 
Saudi Arabia, the Islamic African Relief Agency in Sudan, the Human Relief 
Agency in Egypt (close to the Muslim Brothers) and national Red Crescent 
Societies (part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Society) in 
Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Syria and Yemen. These have usually developed 
strong ties with national governments. The list could, however, also include 
para-state or para-military organizations (such as Emdad in Iran or the Scouts 
Musulmans Algériens and the Oulémas in post-war Algeria, the Organization 
for the Renewal of Islamic Tradition in Kuwait, or the Office for Services to 
the Mujahidin of Afghanistan) (Gellner 1981; Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 
2003; Karshenas and Moghadam 2006; Jawad 2009). 
Even though the religious linkage is not so straightforward, as in the case 
of other non-state actors, clans and tribes should also be included in the list 
of important informal welfare providers in the MENA region. As an exten-
sion of basic social units (e.g., the family), clans and tribes, as in the cases of 
the Ghadala, Megarha Zuwayya and Warfalla tribes in Libya2 guarantee not 
simply the personal security of their members, but also the access to a variety 
of different social services. These social services include employment, income 
support to families, education, housing, and so on. In addition, it should be 
kept in mind that the members of the clans and tribes, often sharing the same 
branch of Islam (e.g. Sunni or Shia Islam), tend, by means of their hierarchical 
structure, to favour specific religious leaders, and, hence, to privilege similar 
group-specific religious precepts, orientations and redistributive priorities. 
The importance of these religious and other non-state actors in collecting 
taxes, redistributing benefits to specific groups of the population and in al-
leviating extreme poverty should not be underestimated. Recent evaluations 
undertaken by the World Bank have shown unambiguously that, despite the 
presence or absence of natural resources, about one in every five persons in 
the region should still be considered poor ($ 2 PPPs). This proportion has 
also remained tragically constant over the last decades, fluctuating between 
20 and 25 percent of the population (Iqbal 2006). Similar considerations ap-
2 See report of GlobalSecurity.org available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/world/libya/tribes.htm
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ply in the case of income inequality, with a Gini coefficient that has, over the 
decades, corresponded to 0.35 and 0.40 (World Bank 2012). What this has 
meant in terms of politics of anger and in the differential inclusion of citizens 
and of groups of the society is the object of the following section. 
6.  social Protection and The Politics of Anger in the Middle East 
and North Africa
In the previous sections the key features of the confessional resource dependent 
welfare regimes of the MENA region have been highlighted. Elite-capture of 
resources, confessional orientation to social protection and dependence from 
oil and gas revenues, in the case of rich oil exporters, or from the state-assets 
acquired by the reigning families in the case of the less rich oil importers have 
been identified as key drivers of reforms. The acquisition of revenues from 
natural resources or of strategic state-assets was subsequently used by political 
elites to ensure their personal enrichment, loyalty to their families and survival 
of their regime. These loyalty-enhancing mechanisms took place through a 
variety of different means, including subsidies to primary goods, to fuels, to 
particular unproductive jobs, and the establishment of special schemes in the 
welfare architecture (Silva et al. 2012). 
The 2008 global financial crisis and the increase in food prices in 
2008 and 2010 has done nothing more than crystallize the already existing 
systemic problems (Bellemare 2012; Silva et al. 2012). It comes then as no 
surprise that anger suddenly exploded quickly crossing national borders and 
territories. This was, on the one hand, the result of a new call for democracy 
and for the modernization of Islam (Adib-Moghaddam 2011), whilst, on the 
other, the consequence of the «politics of mobilization of anger» (Ost 2009) 
inadvertently created by the same authoritarian leaders and regimes in the 
antecedent decades. 
Quite ironically, whilst excessively focusing on the education of the 
youths but not providing sufficient inclusion in the labour market, govern-
ments in this region increased the chances of mass protests, which, subse-
quently, ended in the Arab Spring of 2011 (Campante and Chor 2011). In 
fact, in a study on who participated in the Arab Spring revolution, Bessinger 
et al. (2012) have demonstrated that most participants in the Egyptian and 
Tunisian revolutions were motivated primarily by economic concerns and only, 
secondarily, by desires for civil and political freedoms. The authors explain 
these differences by reference to the disparate strategies of autocratic control 
and welfare politics pursued in pre-revolutionary Tunisia and Egypt and the 
patterns of political opposition, coalitional configurations and cleavages that 
these produced in the regime strategies of control and maintenance (ibidem, 1). 
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Here, political, economic and welfare institutions and, more in particular, 
the model of welfare present in a country paid a determinant role in ensur-
ing social peace and stability, but also, when exclusive, creating new reasons 
for tension. As correctly highlighted by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) and 
Hall and Lamont (2009, 2013), establishing inclusive political, economic and 
welfare institutions is, in this context, crucial for nation-building and economic 
growth, as well as for societal success. When exclusive political, economic and 
welfare institutions were implemented, political conflicts inevitably emerged, 
subsequently determining the paths for societal unrests (see MacAdam et al. 
2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007). In order to promote long-term peace, stabil-
ity and growth, a drastic recalibration of the main functional, redistributive, 
normative and institutional priorities of the welfare architecture is, in this 
context, necessary (Hemerijck 2012) so as to increase social resilience (Hall 
and Lamont 2013). 
As the Arab revolts have unambiguously shown, different negative 
institutional and social mechanisms have over the decades materialized, play-
ing a key role in determining the different patterns of collective action and, 
subsequently, system stability and change. As discussed elsewhere (see Cerami 
2013, esp. ch. 9 and ch. 10), poverty and the increase in vertical and horizontal 
inequalities can, in this context, be addressed as the primary causes of civil 
conflicts, but this tells us nothing about how these driving forces turn into 
practical results. Poverty and inequality (the cause), for example, influenced 
regime change through two interrelated mechanisms: an institutional mecha-
nism and a social mechanism. On the side of the institutional mechanism, 
poverty and inequality produced lock-in and self-reinforcing mechanisms 
that constrained the resources available to the individual and, thus, limited 
the functioning and capabilities of the citizens, precluding their full integra-
tion into society (see Sen 1999). Yet this does not explain the actions. On the 
side of the social mechanism, poverty and inequality enacted a mechanism of 
mobilization of anger that altered the perceptions of social justice (Rawls 2003) 
of the affected individual. Feelings of resentment or simple revenge were, in 
this way, created and the trust in the existing social order reduced. This, in 
turn, motivated actions that led to civil conflict, war and, ultimately, to a more 
general system transformation, including the leading political and economic 
institutions of a country, as well as cultural and social ones (ibidem, 211-212). 
To provide some more clearer examples, a first set of institutional and 
social mechanisms responsible for having hindered poverty-reduction and the 
overall human development goals in the region had to do with the inheritance 
of status inequality. By restricting the chances for successful institutional and 
social interactions (social mechanisms of boundary de-activation and de-
brokerage) (see MacAdam et al. 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007), inheritance 
of status inequality limited, through institutional lock-in and self-reinforcing 
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mechanisms, the possibility of autonomous self-advancement. This was the 
case of most countries of the regions, but especially of Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, 
Syria, Yemen and Tunisia, where being close to the dominant ruling families 
was a determinant factor for societal success. 
A second set of institutional and social mechanisms was related to the 
issue of lost childhood and the need to invest in children and youths. As Esping-
Andersen (2008) has shown, if not adequately addressed by adequate political, 
economic and welfare institutions, the impact of social origins on child out-
comes tends to persist, greatly affecting the chances of the economic and social 
development of a society. Institutional mechanisms of exclusion, which locked-
in vulnerable children and youths in disadvantaged social spheres, included 
those concerned with poor health, and cultural and working environments. 
As income inequality increased, the capacity of parents to provide a better 
future for their children became more unequal, distancing the poor and their 
children from the broader opportunity structure (boundary de-activation and 
de-brokerage). Likewise, by limiting the chances of access to better education 
and training in those sectors of the economy where private investments would 
be too expensive and would offer a limited direct return, deficient investments 
in child and youth well-being, enhanced by welfare institutions, reduced the 
possibility of finding an adequately trained workforce in the labour market 
(Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001). In the countries of the 
MENA regions, especially in Egypt and Tunisia, access to universal education 
was not associated with an access to better jobs, thus precluding the youths a 
full integration in the society and increasing the reasons for mass mobilization.
A third set of institutional and social mechanisms of inequality reproduc-
tion was concerned with the cyclicity of poverty. Through a self-sustaining 
and self-reinforcing institutional mechanism of exclusion, poverty reduced 
the chances of the affected from accessing the most valuable resources, often 
elitist institutions, such as good schools, universities, centers of excellence, 
better equipped hospitals, safe neighborhoods and so on (Petersen 2009). 
Membership of rotary clubs, of elitist sports associations or of prestigious 
universities are probably the best examples, but further important illustrations 
are represented by the confessional involvement. Confessional involvement 
was, for example, determinant in accentuating the formation of particular 
interest groups creating a dangerous links between religious belonging and 
access to the job and the social security market (see Cammett 2014; Cam-
mett and McLean 2014). This was clearly the case of the Sunni Muslim 
Future Movement and the Shiite Muslim Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Dar Al 
Aytam (Muslim Sunni) and Emdad (Muslim Shi’a – affiliated to Hezbollah) 
in Lebanon, the Jami’yyat Da’wa Islamiya in Libya, the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt and in Jordan, the Caritas in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine, 
or the International Islamic Relief Organization in Saudi Arabia, the Human 
Social Protection and the Politics of Anger in the Middle East and North Africa 131
Relief Agency in Egypt and national Red Crescent Societies in Algeria, Jordan, 
Morocco, Syria and Yemen (see discussion above).
A fourth set of institutional and social mechanisms was associated with 
the presence of negative cultural, ethnic or religious repertoires with particular 
reference to those that hindered access to key positions by excluding individuals 
based on class, gender, race or ethnic origin. Sociological studies within this topic 
are innumerable and a list of the most important articles or even books would 
fill several hundred pages. To provide only some very elucidative examples of 
cultural, ethnic or religious exclusive mechanisms specifically tailored to the 
MENA context, in countries where a hard version of Islam is predominant, 
as in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), but also of the new religious 
fundamentalist formations in the Mashreq (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, West 
Bank and Gaza, Egypt) and Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and 
Tunisia) regions, women have more often been subjected to several different 
exclusionary practices. These have ranged from exclusion from employment 
to normal cultural activities (e.g. access to schools and hospitals). 
A final set of institutional and social mechanisms of exclusion concerned 
the access to political power and associated local governance dynamics (Os-
trom 1990; 1995). Excluding poor people from education in the best universi-
ties implied not simply having less access to the labour market but also having 
fewer chances to access political positions in democratic ways. Clearly, when 
all institutional doors were closed by the elites, poor people turned to politi-
cal mobilization and eventually to violence to ensure the representation of 
their interests and access to the few power positions available (Justino 2010). 
As argued before, these negative mechanisms inevitably hinder mutual 
long-term peace, stability and growth, representing an unbearable cost for 
everyone. As a suitable response, the establishment of new institutional and 
social complementarities (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hall and Lamont 2013), 
associated with a more fruitful private sector development (see Mallik and 
Awadallah 2013), would not only allow a faster socio-technical change (Dolata 
2014), but it would also result in a better integration in the labour market, 
expand the citizens’ access to political and economic resources (North et al. 
2009) with subsequent socio-economic progress (Offe 2009).
7. Conclusions
This article has shed light on the important role played by a politicized admi-
nistration of social protection in the reproduction of existing power relations. 
The inefficient contemporary systems of social protection in the MENA 
region have, in fact, left a large section of the population unprotected. As the 
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governments in this region have greatly benefited from the abundance of na-
tural resources (especially oil and gas) or from the acquisition of state assets, 
several distorting mechanisms have set in their economies over the decades. 
These have involved the creation of particularly powerful lobbies, dishonest 
competition, and corruption, which have, subsequently, hampered economic 
growth and social progress. In the absence of efficient political institutions, 
the misappropriation of resources for the redistribution of welfare benefits 
and of social services by the elites has also had a significant negative effect 
on the poverty relief strategies of these countries. While the formal system of 
social protection has proved to be both extremely resilient and inefficient in 
tackling poverty and income inequality, it has been exceptionally successful 
in reproducing existing power relations, and in keeping a well-entrenched 
system of clientelism alive, while enlarging the power of the reigning fami-
lies. The informal system of social protection has become, in this sense, the 
last resort for the most vulnerable citizens and those in urgent need. In this 
process of welfare marginalization, religious non-state actors have been key 
agents in reducing poverty and extreme deprivation. But in the absence of a 
clear Weberian bureaucratic apparatus for the collection and redistribution of 
resources, religious and ethnic divisions have materialized, often with one local, 
ethnic or religious entity granting access to better services to its members at 
the expense of others. The doors for sectarianism and for ethnic and religious 
fundamentalism have, in this way, been opened. In the context of such complex 
institutional and social structures, improving the efficiency of the systems of 
social protection through a more comprehensive approach to the reduction 
of vertical and horizontal inequalities must be seen as the key for success. The 
hope is to contribute to the implementation of new more suitable public sector 
reforms and private sector development that will help to foster the process of 
democratization and the consolidation of democratic institutions in the region. 
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